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I. INTRODUCTION
Victor Fleischer understands that to increase compliance with tax
law, we cannot simply look to a mix of legal penalties and
enforcement. He understands, too, that the role of norms in the
analysis is not simple: his account suggests that norms should not just
echo and reinforce the legal regime. Indeed, he argues that the norms
that most favor compliance might stifle desirable innovation. He
points out that the firms most likely to have engaged in blatant
noncompliance with law in the form of options backdating are
"smaller firms, technology firms, and firms with volatile stock prices."'
These firms are likely to have looser corporate cultures that foster
innovation - but perhaps also "breed noncompliance." 2  Firms
presumably will be largely comprised of people who find the culture
* Professor and Director, Institute for Law and Rationality, University of
Minnesota Law School. I thank the participants of The Future of Tax Shelters
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1 Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate Culture, 26
VA. TAX REV. 1031 (2007).
2 Id. at 1051.
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congenial. And the specific characteristics of those people matter.
Indeed, Fleischer considers as one possible solution to the
problem of tax noncompliance getting "corporations [presumably
those with looser corporate cultures] to hire, as tax directors, people
whose sense of identity prevents them from purchasing tax shelters."3
He suggests as well forcing "increased participation by outside
counsel, who have different professional identities and reputational
concerns." He argues that law firm partners may be more reluctant to
write opinions blessing tax shelters than may others.4 In his footnotes,
he distinguishes, though, between tax lawyers and tax shelter lawyers.
Tax shelter lawyers are not at all reluctant to write tax shelter
opinions - in fact, they make a living creating and promoting such
shelters as well as opining on them. Fleischer will need a way to
ensure that the forced increased participation is by tax lawyers and
not tax shelter lawyers.
Fleischer also discusses work by my co-author Erin O'Hara and
me on trust.6 In our paper, we discuss evidence that strong monitoring
against undesirable conduct may have conflicting effects. On the one
hand, if a person knows she is being monitored, she may behave well,
thinking she is apt to be caught if she does not. But there is also
evidence that people who feel distrusted are apt to test limits; they
may feel that since they are already paying some of the costs of being
distrusted, they might as well get some of the benefits. The result may
be "compliance" that honors a narrow literal interpretation of a rule
but violates its spirit, using aggressive interpretations and "loopholes."
But if a tax lawyer's identity is such as to make aggressive tax planning
costly, even signals of distrust - say, in the form of heavy-handed
regulatory intervention - ought not to cause the lawyer to engage in
such planning.7
I think Fleischer is on to something. As I have argued in other
work,8 1 think, too, that identity more broadly needs to be part of law
and economics analysis. I expand on those arguments as they concern
tax lawyers' views towards compliance with law below.
3 Id. at 1061.
4 Id.
5 See id. at 1055 n.80 and accompanying text.
6 Claire A. Hill & Erin O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. Q.
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with authors).
7 This point follows from arguments I make in Claire A. Hill, The Law and
Economics of Identity, 32 QUEEN'S L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with
author).
8 Id.
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II. TAX LAWYERS, AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING, AND IDENTITY
Traditional law and economics scholarship hypothesizes crude
instrumentalism writ large. To (only slightly?) caricature: people do
things for the benefits those things bring; they can be deterred from
doing those things by lessening those benefits or imposing associated
costs. Canonically, the benefits at issue tend to be money and power
(and leisure).
Law and economics scholars are belatedly recognizing that
identity considerations significantly determine what people do, what
they value, how they can be influenced, and how they see the world. I
can think of many ways in which I could take advantage of others to
get benefits I might value. For instance, when I am shopping in a
small store, the shopkeeper may be in the back of the store - I could
very easily take what I wanted. Instead, I not only do not do so, I
wait, perhaps several minutes, for the shopkeeper to come and take
my money. Why? In part, because taking something without paying
is contrary to my identity as an honest person who generally abides by
the golden rule. Indeed, we constantly make assessments such as
"that is not the sort of thing person X (or I) would do" in deciding
what to do, who to trust, and so on. Hence, potentially, an answer is
provided to the puzzle of why people do not cheat, lie, steal, or take
advantage of others more often.
What about tax lawyers? There is, it is fair to say, a continuum,
from the "(Almost?) Over the Edge Envelope Pushing" tax lawyer to
the "Old Venerable Risk-Hating" tax lawyer with, of course, most
people falling somewhere along the continuum. Benefits to the
"(Almost?) Over the Edge Envelope Pushing" lawyer might include
living dangerously on the edge of detection, being more clever than
her competitors in coming up with a brilliant shelter idea, being clever
in avoiding detection, or the like. For the "Old Venerable Risk-
Hating" lawyer, no such benefits would be available and the
associated costs would loom large. Indeed, something that would be a
cost to Venerable - say, appearing on the front page of the
newspaper as somebody who had designed an aggressive shelter -
might be a benefit to Envelope Pusher. That being said, it is not as
though identities are rigid; they are constantly shaping and evolving.
Many forces - government, one's family and peers, advertisers,
norm-entrepreneurs, serendipity, and others - are involved.
Can identity-shaping be done so as to make envelope pushing less
glamorous, or to make less aggressive behavior more glamorous? Can
the view, espoused by even some very wealthy people such as Warren
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Buffett, that people effectively have a duty to pay tax, win out over a
Leona Helmsley-esque "only the little people pay taxes" ethos? If so,
how might this happen? Should it happen? Certainly, enforcement
costs decrease drastically if people think abiding by the law is "the
right thing to do."
What follows for attempts to reign in aggressive tax planning and
tax noncompliance more broadly? Regulatory interventions should be
designed taking identity into account. And the limits of regulatory
interventions, given, among other things, identity considerations,
should be recognized. Indeed, so long as the appropriate benefits and
costs, including identity benefits and costs, are taken into account,
instrumentalism may be a perfectly plausible analytic handle.
But in all this, we need to recall Fleischer's caveat as to cultures,
which applies as well to individuals: we do not necessarily want to
eliminate all envelope-pushing. Envelope pushing may somehow be
related to innovation, including much desirable innovation. Second,
in the particular context of tax, even independent of the benefits of
encouraging innovation, there may be upsides to some instances of
pushing the envelope - the law may not get it exactly, or even
approximately, right; pushing the envelope can help the society clarify
what the law should be.9
III. CONCLUSION
I mean by this Commentary to do two things. First, I mean to
echo what I take to be Professor Fleischer's core point, that we cannot
properly address tax noncompliance, including aggressive tax planning
purely through straightforward legal means - that we have to take
culture into account. Second, I mean to unpack corporate culture a
bit, starting from the ground up. A firm's corporate culture begins
with the individuals through which the firm operates. We need to
understand what, beyond classic instrumental motivations, influences
individuals' compliance with the law.
9 There may be other ancillary costs of making it too easy to raise revenue;
consideration of this argument is beyond the scope of this Commentary.
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